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Abstract—This article review lessons learned from the uses of
radio-frequency (RF) spectrum at national and international
scales. Its main purpose is to stimulate debate on how to allow
new wireless systems to operate, and to reduce the chronic ap-
parent shortage of RF spectrum. The article aims at a better
understanding of the mechanisms behind spectrum manage-
ment and their pertinence to the public interest. The main
contributions if the article are:
• Considering RF spectrum management as a construct
that structures radio services and, at the same time,
distributes wealth and power;
• Highlighting major doctrines of RF spectrum manage-
ment;
• Promoting spectrum management directly by its users;
• Promoting cooperation and transparency.
The several parts of the paper include the evolution of spec-
trum exploitation, and a foreseeable future by taking a closer
look at major dilemmas and challenges. The paper ends with
general comments and conclusions.
1. Introduction
“There is no more spectrum available”.
This was stated by Herbert Hoover, the US Secretary of
Commerce, in 1925. Since then, the statement has been
heard each time a new wireless service has been proposed.
That shortage of spectrum has been felt as a factor delaying
the social and economic development of society. Various
proposals have been put forward to solve the problem, but
no satisfactory solution has yet been found. The laws of
physics impose absolute limits. Progress in science and
engineering bring us closer to these limits, while admin-
istrative means impose additional restrictions. The latter
result from our choices, more or less deliberate. Better
policy and organization could augment the outcome drawn
from what is physically possible. For example, for all com-
munications between ﬁxed points, cables could be used in-
stead of unguided radio waves, which would leave radio
waves for mobile applications. Satellite networks could
similarly take over from terrestrial networks. Better prop-
agation and system models could lead to more eﬃcient
spectrum use. Alternatively, we could replace ineﬃcient
signal-coding and data-compression technologies with bet-
ter technologies. The Regional Radio Conference (RRC)
on terrestrial broadcasting, held in Geneva in 2004/2006, is
a good example. The participating countries decided there
to move from analog to digital television by June 2015,
which freed a signiﬁcant part of the electromagnetic spec-
trum for other uses. According to Martin Cooper, a pio-
neer of mobile radio, large segments of the radio-frequency
spectrum are underutilized due to outdated ideas and prac-
tices that are still followed [1]. Other professionals have
shared his opinion.
Science and engineering make the spectrum potentially us-
able, but its real use depends on local legal, regulatory, ﬁ-
nancial, and also perhaps other factors. Diplomats, lawyers,
economists, and engineers gather every few years to re-
view and improve the intergovernmental treaties that reg-
ulate the uses of radio waves. Traditionally, when doing
that they strictly observe the consensus principle. The con-
sensus requirement assures that the majority cannot impose
regulations that would harm any vital interests of a single
country. As a consequence, with unbalanced representa-
tion the conference results might be biased. That could
put some spectrum user groups not represented at the con-
ference in an inconvenient situation, which could last for
decades. The nearest such event, the World Radio Confer-
ence, will be held in Geneva, Switzerland, from Novem-
ber 2 to 27, 2015 [2]. As at such previous conferences,
URSI will certainly participate as an observer, i.e., with
no voting rights. However, individual URSI scientists can
participate and vote if they are members of national dele-
gations.
The target readers of this review are all of those interested
in radio and spectrum management mechanisms who do not
actively participate in such activities. Because of this, this
paper draws heavily from the authors’ earlier publications,
lectures, and discussions at spectrum management working
groups they chaired in URSI and in other bodies, such as
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). How-
ever, the opinions expressed here are the authors’ personal
opinions.
2. Spectrum Exploitation
This section deals with key ideas and practices inherited
from the past. It starts with the genesis of state intervention,
national spectrum management, and intergovernmental col-
laboration. The USA is taken as an example for national
management. The mechanism of international regulations
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in the framework of the International Telecommunication
Union is then brieﬂy reviewed. The role of scientiﬁc re-
search is outlined, as is the cooperation with URSI and
other organizations.
2.1. Unregulated Commons
Radio is associated with the names of James Clerk
Maxwell, Heinrich Hertz, and Alexander Popov. None of
these marketed his discovery: they were motivated only by
scientiﬁc curiosity. The ﬁrst radio company in the world
was the Wireless Telegraph & Signal Company, founded
by Guglielmo Marconi in Great Britain, in 1897. It started
with wireless telegraphs for navies. Since then, military
needs have continued to be the major force behind the
technological progress of the wireless sector, the extraor-
dinary success of which continues until today. Marconi
marked the birth of a new industry that began transforming
the Industrial Society into the future Knowledge Society.
We all take part in that process, whether we want to or not,
having only minuscule inﬂuence on it and a very vague idea
of where it will ultimately bring us. The way we use the
spectrum can accelerate that process, or can slow it down.
Marconi’s company oﬀered equipment and services. The
spectrum eﬃciency of his spark-gap transmitters was very
low. Their emissions occupied almost the then entire us-
able radio spectrum over large geographic areas (e.g., some
250 million square kilometers), yet carried only of the order
of single bits every few seconds. The Earth’s surface could
accommodate only a few such transmissions at a time. To
avoid interference, the operators invented the rule of “listen
before transmit”, which has been adapted many years later
in some local-area wireless computer networking systems,
such as Aloha and Wi-Fi. This latter network, which is
presently very popular, is based on the Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standards.
The radio-frequency spectrum was dealt with as a natural
“commons” for free use by everybody, just as the air is used
for breathing. Commons refers to resources that are not pri-
vately owned, and are accessible to all members of society.
They can include everything from natural resources and
common land to computer software. When commonly held
property is transformed into private property, this process
is known as “enclosure” or “privatization”.
Marconi patented his wireless telegraph to assure him
a monopoly, and to block other companies from developing
similar devices and services. However, his monopoly did
not last long, and new companies appeared in the market.
They all chose to compete instead of cooperating, and the
competition was ﬁerce. To strengthen his position, Marconi
tried various means. He had a good relationship with the
ruling class in Italy, as did his spouse in Great Britain. His
opponents accused him of bribery of the highest govern-
mental oﬃcials to obtain lucrative governmental contracts.
The accusations led to political scandal in Great Britain,
known widely as the “Marconi scandal”, but Marconi did
not lose much. It was the ﬁrst known corruption case in
the radio business.
To force people to use his services and devices, Marconi did
order his radio operators to ignore messages sent using the
competitors’ devices, in spite of the fact that in maritime
emergencies, the consequences could be tragic. With no
regulations, this was quite normal, and in accordance with
the concepts of free competition and the Darwinian doctrine
of survival of the ﬁttest. One of Marconi’s competitors was
Karl Ferdinand Braun (who shared the 1909 Nobel Prize
in Physics with Marconi). Braun was associated with the
German Telefunken Company.
Defending the company’s interests, the German government
intervened to break down Marconi’s monopoly once and
forever. The personal experience of a family member of
the German Emperor had an eﬀect: his courtesy radio tele-
gram to the US President was rejected by a Marconi opera-
tor simply because it was sent from a German-made device.
Certainly, there were numerous similar cases, but none di-
rectly touched such high personalities. They initiated the
international radio regulatory activities that have continued
until now. As a consequence of the incident, a prepara-
tory radio conference was called in Berlin in 1903, just six
years after Marconi opened his company. The focus was on
the maritime services, interconnections, and ﬁnancial set-
tlements. Interconnectivity does not happen by itself, since
it is not in the incumbent’s interest to share the income
with competitors.
2.2. First Intergovernmental Agreements
The proposed regulations included two important obliga-
tions. The ﬁrst was to receive and process emergency ra-
dio messages, no matter what their origin. The second was
to continuously watch for distress signals. These propos-
als turned out to be impossible to adopt at the conference,
and the delegations decided to come back to them at the
next conference, at the same place, three years later. The
Berlin 1906 conference (1) allocated two frequency bands
(around 0.5 MHz and 1 MHz) for public correspondence,
(2) founded the International Radiotelegraph Union (IRU),
and (3) signed the International Radiotelegraph Convention.
By setting the rules on how the electromagnetic spectrum
was to be used, the signatories de facto declared its collec-
tive ownership. However, other independent nations could
join, acquiring the same rights. Speciﬁc spectrum uses
were to be registered, and the IRU Bern Oﬃce recorded
the ship stations in operation (known as the “Bern List”).
However, an inherent conﬂict appeared at the conference
between private interests and public interests. Marconi suc-
ceeded in ensuring that the governments of Great Britain
and Italy opposed the convention, in order to defend his
company’s interests. The regulations had to wait six more
years, until the following conference in London. The losses
due to the delay have never been evaluated. It was the only
case of direct governmental protection of a speciﬁc com-
pany at radio conferences [3] that the authors have found
in oﬃcial documents. If similar cases happened, they were
made outside of the conference rooms.
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International treaties are part of a worldwide game that
governments agree to play. Consensus is an inevitable in-
gredient, as there are few things able to force a state. Con-
ference negotiations aim at balancing conﬂicting interests,
and large companies have a strong say there. The Berlin
controversies had to wait until the 1912 London conference.
The famous Titanic disaster was not without eﬀect on the
approval, which happened just three months before the con-
ference, and could have been avoided if an agreement had
been in place. This luxury ship sank with some 1500 pas-
sengers, after colliding with an iceberg during her maiden
voyage. Distress signals were immediately sent by radio,
but none of the ships that responded were near enough to
reach her before she sank. However, a nearby ship that
could assist, the Californian, failed because her radio op-
erator switched his radio oﬀ after the daylong watch, and
the message did not get through [4]. The Titanic disas-
ter did directly or indirectly touch many very wealthy and
inﬂuential people of the time. They were shocked by the
story, and so was the general public. Numerous books and
ﬁlms have kept the memory of that tragedy alive until to-
day. Certainly, the disaster contributed to the approval of
the regulations proposed six years earlier.
To improve the coordination of the uses made of radio
spectrum, the IRU was transformed into the present In-
ternational Telecommunication Union (ITU), without ma-
jor changes in the basic philosophy and regulations earlier
agreed to. The ITU is the UN Agency for Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT), with a total member-
ship of over 190 Member States, and some 700 private
companies from around the world. It consists of three Sec-
tors: Radiocommunication, Standardization, and Develop-
ment. The Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) coordi-
nates radio-communication services, and the international
management of the radio-frequency spectrum and satellite
orbits. It also develops common technical standards and
recommendations, and maintains Radio Regulations and
the Master International Frequency Register (MIFR). The
Radio Regulations are a binding international treaty, setting
out the allocation of frequency bands for diﬀerent radio ser-
vices. They also set technical parameters to be observed by
radio stations, and procedures for the notiﬁcation and in-
ternational coordination of speciﬁc frequencies assigned to
the stations by Administrations, as well as other procedures
and operational provisions. Radio Regulations are set and
modiﬁed by consensus of all the Member countries at radio
conferences; more details are given below.
2.3. National Spectrum Management
National spectrum management and international treaties
regulating spectrum exploitation were born at about the
same time. Since the very beginning, they have been
closely interrelated: modiﬁcations of one of them in turn
induce a series of consequential changes in the other.
However, while the international use of spectrum requires
collective consensus of all Member States, every State is
fully sovereign for regulating its national uses, as long as
it does not touch other country’s interests. Consequently,
if a station wants its use of radio frequency to be interna-
tionally recognized, it must be recorded in the ITU Master
International Frequency Register. The notiﬁcation process
includes veriﬁcation of whether or not the station’s param-
eters agree with the radio regulations and plans in force.
ITU only charges for the nominal cost of work. In 1963,
the governments extended the concept of spectrum com-
mons to include artiﬁcial satellites. Since then, the orbital
parameters and frequencies of satellites have been recorded
in the Master International Frequency Register.
In practice, the governments translate the Radio Regula-
tions into their national regulations, and assign portions of
the spectrum resources among their subjects. Most have in-
troduced the obligatory national spectrum licensing associ-
ated with a spectrum-fee system, in spite of the fact that no
country pays for the spectrum. Indeed, the fees can be seen
as an extra tax imposed on the spectrum users to feed the
governmental budget and development plans in sectors that
may be far away from telecommunications. Details may
diﬀer from country to country. The license oﬀers rights to
exploit a speciﬁed band of frequencies under speciﬁed con-
ditions and for a speciﬁed time, which can be – and most
often is – extended over the following years. This makes
the license quasi-permanent. In some countries, the license
is transferable, which makes it not much diﬀerent from an
ownership certiﬁcate. The ways in which the licenses have
been issued also diﬀer from country to country, and may
change with time. By issuing a license, a government can
(and often does) control by whom, how, where, and when
the spectrum is used, and for what purpose. This is often
criticized: we will come back to that in a later section.
Traditionally, the license is awarded on the basis of senior-
ity (the “ﬁrst come – ﬁrst served” rule), in comparative
hearings, also called “beauty contests” (this could also be
done by lottery). The ﬁrst approach is the simplest to man-
age, automate, and control. The second approach is based
on merit: a jury representing diverse entities considers all
the proposals, compares their relative merits, and grants
the license to the most-valued proposal. If the process is
open to the public with an elected independent jury, the
process is known as a “beauty contest”. Otherwise, it is
often named the “command and control” approach. This is
more complex and more time-consuming than the previous
procedure, and the “merits” and “values” are often vaguely
deﬁned. However, this is the only way to take into account
the social consequences of the licensing decision. Dis-
tributing the licenses via lottery has not found supporters.
Another approach is privatization or auctioning, discussed
in a following section.
2.3.1. The FCC Example
This section deals with the US Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), for two reasons. First, the FCC is
one of the oldest and most-experienced radio regulatory
agencies in the world. Second, a number of countries
have drawn heavily from its experience, as did international
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spectrum management. World War I accelerated the devel-
opment of radio technology, and the global center of the ra-
dio industry moved to the USA after the war. New services
appeared: the service that developed most dynamically was
broadcasting. It has proven its usefulness in commerce (ad-
vertising) and in politics. It has become a strong force in
modern society, often abused to manipulate public opinion.
A growing number of transmitters soon resulted in mutual
interference, which lowered both the quality of transmis-
sions and proﬁts. In their rivalry for listeners, the operators
increased the signal power radiated, which led to a power
race, more interference, and more litigation. The era of
spectrum plenty ended. A new era of spectrum scarcity be-
gan: it was just at that time that Herbert Hoover declared
the lack of spectrum, as quoted in the introduction. All
those interested agreed that the free market could not solve
the problem, and governmental intervention was necessary.
In 1926, a special governmental agency, the Federal Radio
Commission (FRC), was created to regulate spectrum uses.
The FRC was later transformed into the present Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), which exists now.
It deals with commercial radio, television, wire, satellite,
and cable “as the public interest, convenience, or necessity”
require.
There are ﬁve independent Commissioners of equal power
who direct the FCC, which is a rather unique structure: in
other agencies, there is typically only one director. Every
candidate is proposed by the US President and conﬁrmed
by the Congress; the president also nominates the Chair.
None of the Commissioners can have a ﬁnancial interest in
any Commission-related business, but each is required to
be thoroughly familiar with the radio sector. Only three of
them may be members of the same political party. They
have to act in a fully transparent manner. Supposedly, the
US legislature set all these precautions to assure that FCC
decisions are impartial, fair, and free of political or com-
mercial inﬂuences. In spite of this, some FCC decisions
have been criticized as being biased. Critical voices were
also heard when it was disclosed that the FCC Chair nom-
inated in 2013 had earlier worked as a lobbyist for the
cable and wireless industry. The FCC alone employs about
1900 persons, and spends some US$350 million per year.
These resources are needed to manage commercial appli-
cations of the spectrum. They do not cover the govern-
mental spectrum uses that are managed by the National
Telecommunication and Information Agency (NTIA). The
FCC homepage also lists the Interdepartmental Radio Ad-
visory Committee, which helps to coordinate all activities
related to spectrum use in the country [5].
2.4. Spectrum Management Evolution
2.4.1. Global and Regional Spectrum Management
The two Berlin conferences marked the end of the era of
unregulated spectrum commons, and the beginning of spec-
trum regulation. Garrett Hardin, a prominent American
ecologist, showed many years later that any unregulated
commons is unsustainable by its very nature [6]. His fa-
mous phrase, the “tragedy of commons”, has often been
misused in spectrum-related discussions. The spectrum
has become the natural public goods (commons) belong-
ing to the whole of humanity, represented by the sovereign
governments: parties to the Convention. This was in ac-
cordance with the ideas of Henry George, an inﬂuential
American economist, writer, and politician. George held
that people could own and trade what they create, but things
found in nature should belong to all. The States have agreed
that they are the sole sovereign entities deciding (together)
on how the spectrum is to be used. Each state shall have
free access to the spectrum. The spectrum shall not be
traded, but its uses shall be regulated.
World War I did freeze international cooperation and ac-
celerated the development of radio technology at the same
time. The ﬁrst radio conference after the war was held in
Washington, DC, in 1927, just after the FCC was created
in the USA. Many famous scientists participated, includ-
ing Edward V. Appleton, the future laureate of the 1947
Nobel Prize in Physics. The Washington Conference up-
dated the international spectrum-management system. It
reviewed the Radio Regulations, deﬁned a number of new
radio services, allocated a speciﬁc frequency band to each,
and extended the regulated frequency range up to 60 MHz.
Similarly, World War II again froze the collaboration, and
accelerated the development of radio technology. Just after
the war, the Allied countries imposed a new international
deal, aimed at “lasting international peace, justice, collabo-
ration, and mutual trust”. The United Nations organization
was created, and the ITU became straightaway its special-
ized agency. The 1947 conference held in Atlantic City
again extended the amount of regulated spectrum, and in-
troduced new allocations.
Among others milestones, the non-telecommunication use
of radio-frequency energy was recognized there. Speciﬁc
radio bands were reserved for industrial, scientiﬁc, medical
[ISM], and domestic uses. Since then, the power indus-
try developed enormously. Collecting solar power in outer
space and transporting it to the Earth’s surface using mi-
crowaves was proposed decades ago. Wireless powering
reappeared in relation to the powering of drones, electric
cars, and the Internet of Things. The present tiny ISM fre-
quency bands may be insuﬃcient for such new applications,
and additional bands may be necessary. In addition, ISM
bands have now successfully been used for new telecommu-
nication systems, such as Wi-Fi and similar systems. New
powering systems operating in these bands create a serious
potential threat to them.
Technology development continued: the subsequent confer-
ences adapted the regulations to the changing reality. The
1959 radio conference accepted the idea of “passive ser-
vices”. Until then, a service had to transmit radio waves to
be qualiﬁed as such: those services that only received sig-
nals had been outside the purview of the Radio Regulations.
For instance, radio astronomy, remote sensing of the Earth,
etc., were excluded. The regulations began to diﬀerentiate
between the physical use of spectrum, when a frequency
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band and part of space was “ﬁlled in” with RF energy, and
the administrative use of spectrum, when it was reserved
for signal reception, or for a future use. The ﬁrst Con-
ference for Space Communications was held in 1963, just
six years after the Soviet Union launched the ﬁrst artiﬁcial
satellite around the Earth. This conference extended the
ITU-regulated commons over outer space and geostation-
ary satellite orbits. New space services were deﬁned, new
spectrum allocations were made, satellite positions were
assigned, and Radio Regulations were updated. The Outer
Space Treaty entered into force in 1967. It explicitly stated
that outer space was “not subject to national appropriation
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or
by any other means”, like the earlier spectrum. In 1992,
spectrum allocations for Global Mobile Personal Commu-
nications by Satellite (GMPCS) were made. This opened
new possibilities, earlier unimagined and not yet explored
in full. This also signiﬁcantly removed the pressure on the
terrestrial spectrum, but increased further disproportions
existing among the ITU Member States, at the same time.
As previously, the electromagnetic spectrum and satellite
orbits were collectively managed by all the ITU Member
States on behalf of and for the beneﬁt of all the people of
the world. Further information can be found in [7] and on
the ITU Internet home page.
The radio conferences are practical means for managing
the spectrum. They may be worldwide or regional, general
or specialized. The general conferences are authorized to
deal with virtually all aspects of spectrum use. The special-
ized conferences deal with particular services and/or par-
ticular portions of the spectrum. The regional conferences
are held to solve speciﬁc spectrum use problems within
particular geographic regions. Some Radiocommunication
Conferences are convened to negotiate and agree upon in-
ternational frequency plans for speciﬁc applications, geo-
graphical regions, and frequency bands, which are subject
to a priori planning. They are organized regularly and when
needed. The participants in the conferences are oﬃcial gov-
ernmental delegations of the ITU Member Countries, each
having one voice. The conferences are also open to inter-
governmental organizations and the specialized agencies of
the United Nations. Nongovernmental entities authorized
by their countries are admitted, too (since 1993).
2.4.2. Worldwide and Regional Radio Conferences
Radio Conferences, worldwide and regional, serve as the
foundation of global spectrum management in the frame-
work of the ITU. As they all are similar, we here present
only one: the Regional Radio Conference (RRC) Geneva
2004/2006, which opened a new era in global manage-
ment of spectrum for digital broadcasting. It was called
to coordinate the deployment of some 70500 transmitting
stations in 118 countries. Two conditions were imposed:
(1) no more than 448 MHz of spectrum should be used,
and (2) the plan should assure the conﬂict-free operation
of the stations, without causing or suﬀering unacceptable
interference as much as practical. The conference was split
into two sessions, the ﬁrst held in 2004 and the second
in 2006. The preparations took six years. At the ﬁrst
session, the participating countries agreed upon the princi-
ples, technical characteristics, and working methods. Each
country deﬁned then its requirements during the interses-
sion period. The requirements were submitted to the sec-
ond session for iterative adjustments, if necessary. Over
1000 delegates worked hard for ﬁve weeks at formal ses-
sions, working groups, and private meetings. The success
was possible thanks to the good will and high competence
of the participants, as well as the exemplary cooperation
between the ITU Secretariat, the European Broadcasting
Union (EBU), and the European Organization for Nuclear
Research (CERN). The iterative planning was largely auto-
mated, based on the software developed by the European
Broadcasting Union. Two computer networks were used.
One was the ITU’s distributed system of some 100 per-
sonal computers. The other was the CERN Grid infras-
tructure, with a few hundred dedicated computers. The
outcome was a new treaty replacing the earlier agreements
concerning analogue broadcasting plans that existed since
1961 for Europe, and since 1989 for Africa [8]. Figure 1
is a photo of the plan for digital television in the printed
version (over 2000 A4 pages), and in the electronically
readable version on CD. With this plan, a signiﬁcant part
of the electromagnetic spectrum was made open for other
uses, the well-known “Digital Dividend” [9]. Not all coun-
tries participated in the conference. Some questioned the
spectrum-planning idea in general: see the discussion be-
low for the reasons.
Fig. 1. A photo of the Plan TV GE 06, CD and printed ver-
sions (courtesy of the National Institute of Telecommunications,
Poland).1
2.4.3. Radio Regulations Board
Consecutive ITU radio conferences are usually separated by
a period of a few years. If an urgent international problem
arises in the time between them, it is the Radio Regulations
Board (RRB) that decides what to do until the nearest con-
ference. It is the only ITU body authorized to decide which
party is right and which party is wrong, in an objective
and fully transparent procedure. During the conferences,
1See color pictures online at www.nit.eu/publications/journal-jtit
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the board members participate in their advisory capacity.
This section describes how the Radio Regulations Board
has evolved.
Each Radio Conference makes Radio Regulations more de-
tailed, and more diﬃcult to interpret and to implement.
From a few pages in 1906, their volume increased to more
than 1000 pages, not counting numerous frequency plans
and agreements separately published. Probably the largest
changes introduced by a single conference took place at
the 1947 Atlantic City conference. To assist the Mem-
bers in practical implementation of these changes, the con-
ference created the International Frequency Registration
Board (IFRB), which years later became the present Ra-
dio Regulations Board (RRB). It was modeled after the
FCC, discussed in a previous section. The board members
are elected by all the Member States at the Plenipotentiary
Conference. They have to act independently, and serve as
“custodians of an international public trust”. They must be
“thoroughly qualiﬁed by technical training in the ﬁeld of
radio and possessing practical experience in the assignment
and utilization of frequencies”. Interestingly, such qualiﬁ-
cations are only required in regard to the Board members:
the other elected ITU oﬃcials can be lawyers, managers,
etc., with no technical training at all. The board’s deci-
sions have been ultimate: only the Member States can
change them. In spite of several revisions of the ITU’s
basic documents, the substance of these provisions has not
been changed until now. Traditionally, the board works in
full transparency, with the documentation of each case open
to all interested ITU Members. However, recently a party
requested that its case be considered behind closed doors,
referring to its trade secrets, but the board rejected that
request.
The board was envisioned “as something of a cross between
the Federal Communication Commission and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice” to solve urgent intergovernmental
conﬂicts that appear during the periods between the con-
ferences [10]. In reality, it never achieved any status com-
parable to the Court of Justice. The major reason was
the failure of Member States to allow the board to per-
form all of its functions as an intergovernmental arbitrator
on the frequency uses: it seemingly was not in the best
interest of the largest corporations. The 1965 Montreux
Plenipotentiary Conference might even have abolished the
board completely, had it not been strongly supported by the
developing countries, as Codding noted. These countries
considered the board as a neutral body, capable of assisting
in protecting their interests in conﬂicts with foreign compa-
nies. The board has survived, but its size and importance
was reduced, and the pressure of some countries to get rid
of it continued. In 1994, the full-time board was replaced
by a part-time board and its Secretariat was merged with the
CCIR Secretariat into one Radiocommunication Bureau.
2.4.4. CCIR Supporting Studies
The success of the Geneva 2004/2006 conference was
possible thanks to earlier careful studies in the European
Broadcasting Union and elsewhere. Indeed, it was realized
early that negotiations at the Radio Conferences required
a lot of background scientiﬁc and engineering knowledge.
With this in mind, the 1927 Washington conference cre-
ated a special organ within the ITU, the International Radio
Consultative Committee (CCIR) and its Study Groups. The
aim was to facilitate the conferences by separating discus-
sions on the well-deﬁned engineering issues from political
and economic negotiations. The Member Countries deﬁned
questions to be studied (voluntarily), and the results of these
studies were submitted to the conference. They were also
independently published in the form of the famous CCIR
Green Books, Recommendations, Reports, and Handbooks.
The CCIR studies signiﬁcantly contributed to the diﬀusion
of the progress in radio science and engineering.
The spectrum-scarcity problem had to wait until the CCIR
General Assembly New Delhi 1970 created the Study
Group on Spectrum Management and Monitoring. The as-
sembly elected the ﬁrst author (R. S.) as its Vice Chair; he
served in that function until he became a CCIR oﬃcial in
1985. CCIR contributed to the development of spectrum
engineering, frequency planning, electromagnetic compati-
bility, and related disciplines. In 1994, CCIR became a part
of the ITU-R Sector and ceased to exist as a separate organ,
but the Study Groups and working methods have continued
until now. Their publications have enjoyed great popularity,
as have computer programs [11], [12]. More recently, in
parallel with the Study Groups, the ITU has organized a se-
ries of open seminars and conferences devoted to speciﬁc
problems of current interest, e.g., the Kaleidoscope Events.
That collaboration proved to be extremely useful, in spite
of some limitations discussed below.
2.4.5. URSI Contributions
The CCIR/ITU Study Groups have drawn heavily from
the knowledge voluntarily brought by other organizations
and individuals. Richard Kirby, the then CCIR Director,
noted [13]:
Even in the earliest days of radio, some of the
best scientiﬁc minds were challenged by the
problem of sharing the radio frequency spec-
trum among diﬀerent users.
The International Union of Radio Science (URSI) was one
of the ﬁrst such organizations. The ﬁrst URSI General As-
sembly was held in Brussels in July 1922 [14]. URSI was
born under the patronage of the Belgian King Leopold II.
As the possessor of the Belgian Congo, he was materi-
ally interested in having inexpensive communication means
with (and within) his colony. At that time, with no satel-
lites, only terrestrial radio could oﬀer such communica-
tions, and URSI greatly contributed to progressing radio
science and in removing obstacles in the way to global radio
services. The second General Assembly of URSI and the
ITU radio conference in Washington in 1927 were jointly
organized, and URSI took an active part in the creation of
the CCIR. Many URSI scientists were involved, contribut-
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Fig. 2. Auction prices given in Euro/MHz/Population, from [22]. (Note: This is for paired spectrum. The Euro/MHz/Population values
were based on historical exchange rates when the diﬀerent auctions were worked out. When calculating Euro/MHz/Population, the sum
of the uplink and downlink bandwidth was taken into account. In auctions where paired/unpaired spectrum was sold in bundles, the
amount of paired spectrum was used.).
ing to the development of radio science and its applications,
and to strengthening the role of science in intergovernmen-
tal agreements. Since then, a number of URSI reports have
been approved by CCIR and used by ITU Members without
modiﬁcations.
The collaboration was most eﬀective when Balthazar Van
der Pol, URSI Vice President (1934–1950) and Honorary
President (1952–1959), also served as the CCIR Director
(1949–1956). The URSI General Assembly in Tel Aviv in
1987, after the CCIR presentation [15], created the Working
Group on Spectrum Management in Commission E, with
the ﬁrst author (R. S.) as its ﬁrst Chair. However, he soon
had to withdraw because it “could create potential conﬂicts”
between CCIR and URSI according to ITU legal advisors,
as URSI is a non-governmental entity, while CCIR/ITU
was an intergovernmental organization. With time, some
URSI scientists also lost their initial enthusiasm (except for
radio astronomers and remote-sensing specialists), and the
group was temporarily inactive. Some wonder if it could
be related to changes in the funding mechanism of research
projects and in an increased role of big companies, which
are more interested in competition and exclusive spectrum
use rather than in sharing the spectrum with others. The
working group on spectrum was reestablished at the URSI
General Assembly in 2005.
2.4.6. Other Contributions
URSI was not alone: numerous scientiﬁc and R&D labo-
ratories (governmental and private) from around the world
have supported the CCIR/ITU-R Study Groups. Their
contributions to spectrum management cannot be overval-
ued. They are too many to be all listed here. The In-
stitute of Radio Engineers (IRE), established in 1912, is
one of the oldest. In 1963, it transformed into the In-
stitute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), the
world’s largest professional association for the advance-
ment of technology, according to their declaration. Among
scientists, it is known not only through its numerous pub-
lications and conferences, but also through its Fellow pro-
gram of professional recognition. The ﬁrst IEEE Fellow
was Jonathan Zenneck, a German physicist famous for his
work on radiowave propagation over the Earth’s surface in
the 1900s. The IRE Professional Group on Communica-
tions Systems (PGCS) was organized in 1952. Five years
later, the group on Radio Frequency Interference (PGRFI)
was created. Later, they became the present IEEE Com-
munication Society (ComSoc) and the IEEE Electromag-
netic Compatibility Society (EMC-S), respectively. These
are some of the ﬁrst organizations that called attention to
the spectrum-scarcity problems, and have played a major
role in shaping spectrum management. Their reports are
the deﬁnitive works representing the collective wisdom of
some of the most distinguished leaders in science and en-
gineering [16]–[18]. Recent IEEE activities in that area
are coordinated by the IEEE Dynamic Spectrum Access
Networks (DySpAN) Committee, among others. The spec-
trum-utilization issues were also debated at IEEE spon-
sored symposia around the globe, e.g., the International
Wroclaw Symposia and EMC Zurich Symposia, organized
since 1972, currently, the EMC Europe Symposia.
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Lots of improvements in spectrum management came as
a result of DARPA, MITRE, and NATO projects [19], [20].
In Europe, studies of the European Broadcasting Union
(EBU) have been highly valued and often served as the
basis for Radio Conferences: this was the case of the Re-
gional Radio Conference Geneva 2004/2006, mentioned
earlier. Many saw the UK’s Radiocommunication Agency
(now OFCOM), with its cooperating R&D university teams,
as one of the world leaders in spectrum management and
engineering [21]. More recently, the European Commis-
sion (EC), with the European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) and its Eu-
ropean Communications Oﬃce (ECO), have been success-
fully working towards improved spectrum use. They have
created various groups and committees (e.g., the Radio
Spectrum Policy Group, RSPG, and the Radio Spectrum
Committee, RSC), and supported specialized symposia and
conferences. These studies are in close association with the
ITU studies, and most of their results are freely available
via the Internet.
2.4.7. National Spectrum Management
Since the nineties, in addition to traditional administrative
spectrum licensing, auctions have become a popular na-
tional methodology also believed to create incentives for
eﬀective utilization of spectrum, as well as revenue for gov-
ernments. Figure 2 shows the spectrum price (in Euros per
MHz per capita) observed at auctions in various countries
in the years 2006 to 2011. The amount paid in the auctions
was covered in consumer bills, as no company would op-
erate to lose money. It was the highest in India, some three
thousand times higher than in the Netherlands: if related
to the average income per capita, the diﬀerence would be
even greater.
2.5. Regulated RF Spectrum
This section is a short summary of the major practical
results of common studies and collaborative negotiations
within the ITU framework. Historically, the ITU has di-
vided the world into three regions, as shown in Fig. 3,
for the purposes of managing the global radio spectrum
and in order to avoid harmful interference between sys-
tems. Each region has speciﬁc allocation plans, by consid-
ering regionally harmonized bands, which take into account
regional standards and peculiar aspects of the respective
markets.
Region 1 comprises Europe, Africa, the Middle East, the
former Soviet Union, and Mongolia. Region 2 covers the
Americas, Greenland, and some Paciﬁc Islands. Region 3
contains most of non-former-Soviet-Union, Asia, and most
of Oceania. The ITU Members have been dealing with the
regulated frequency bands as often as they found it useful,
according to the above three regions.
Radio Conferences change Radio Regulations, often ex-
tending the spectrum limits as shown in Fig. 4. The 2015
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 3. A map of ITU: (a) Region 1, (b) Region 2, (c) Region 3.
World Radio Conference will discuss possible further ex-
tensions.
The total volume of regulated spectrum has been approxi-
mately doubling every 30 months or so, as Cooper, quoted
earlier, calculated. He added [1]:
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Fig. 4. The maximum frequency allocated in the Radio Regu-
lations by Radio Conferences in the years from 1906 to 2015.
(Note: The complete lists of the ITU conferences can be found
in [23]).
Since 1901, . . . spectral eﬃciency in telephone
communications has improved by a factor of
about one trillion. Since 1948, it has improved
a million times over. And when introduced
in 1983, cellular communications immediately
oﬀered a ten-fold increase in spectrum ca-
pacity – by transmitting in 30 MHz of spec-
trum what would have taken 300 MHz to trans-
mit with the previous generation of technol-
ogy. Today’s cellular systems are better than
100 times more eﬃcient than the mobile tele-
phones of the 1980s.
It should be noted here that radiowave propagation eﬀects
make some frequency bands unsuitable for speciﬁc appli-
cations. The total regulated spectrum is divided into small
pieces, each allocated to a speciﬁc service or use, such
as terrestrial, or space services; ﬁxed, or mobile services;
industrial, medical, domestic, and scientiﬁc applications,
generally the same in all Regions. Some details may,
however, diﬀer from country to country and from region
to region, which obstructs the free movement of devices
(e.g., mobile phones) and international exchange. For ex-
ample, Fig. 5 shows the current national allocations for
Portugal.
3. Spectrum-Management Trends
This part focuses on foreseeable perspectives of spec-
trum management. Radio services [24] have increased in
popularity. This has been a steady trend since the radio
was ﬁrst invented. This has also been true of the de-
mand for access to radio frequencies. One traditional way
of meeting the demand is to use increasingly higher and
not-yet-explored radio frequencies, and to develop more-
eﬃcient methods for spectrum utilization. The manage-
ment of the spectrum of these must also be developed,
as described in previous sections. Spectrum management
in the future will be a mixture of the current practice
of today, with an emphasis on improving eﬃcient spec-
trum utilization. There are several multidisciplinary factors
that play important roles. These comprise the physics of
electromagnetic waves and their propagation, technology
for spectrum utilization and handling interference, mar-
ket mechanisms for access to spectrum, and regulatory
regimes.
Future spectrum management must take all of these into
consideration through a good understanding of physics,
technology, and economics in developing the rules for the
actors involved. Furthermore, spectrum eﬃciency must be
taken into account, addressing the desired beneﬁt from our
collective utilization of the radio spectrum. There is no sin-
gle metric that can be used in this respect [25]. Technical,
economic, and societal judgments therefore apply. In the
following, the article is organized in subsections on spec-
trum management through administrative, trade, and free
access to the resources.
3.1. Administrative Assignment
In a way, there must be some administrative rules irre-
spective of the spectrum-management method used. By
assigning exclusive rights to use spectrum at a frequency
and in an area, the national spectrum authority gives a user
great freedom within the set of constraints that come with
the right. No one else can deploy the same spectrum in
this area. The rights are often given for many years, to
allow sustainable business to be established or continued.
Although this describes current spectrum management in
many situations, it will most likely continue this way in the
foreseeable future for a large part of the spectrum.
Within some services, there is an increasing concern about
spectrum scarcity. In particular, mobile data is growing so
fast that many operators will be looking for new spectrum
resources. Of course, the scarcity also leads to innovation,
such that the same amount of spectrum can be used for
more traﬃc and more terminals. Furthermore, many ap-
plicants often wish to establish business, and this itself
becomes an incentive to make good use of often highly
costly access rights. The authorities must look for improved
methods of assigning frequency rights. One example is
to use graphtheoretic methods in assigning frequency for
radio links in popular bands [26], contrasting the usually
simplistic methods used today for making assignments. The
study indeed indicated a potential for getting noticeably
more out of the spectrum, and suggested a closer interdis-
ciplinary collaboration between experts of radiowave prop-
agation and frequency assignments.
Although often all spectrum of interest is already allocated
for some service types and even assigned to users, mea-
surements show that only a limited part is utilized at given
location and time (see, for example, [27], indicating an
overall utilization of 11.2% in Hull, UK, of bands rang-
ing from 180 MHz to 2700 MHz). These types of observa-
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Fig. 5. The national spectrum allocation in Portugal (courtesy of ANACOM).
tions, among other aspects, have motivated the develop-
ment of cognitive radio equipment that can take advan-
tage of the frequency blocks and time slots when no one
else is using them. From the spectrum-management side,
this needs development of rules that on the one side mo-
tivates equipment vendors to develop suitable technology,
and on the other side motivates operators to invest in the
technology.
A broad area is dynamic spectrum sharing, as diﬀerent
from traditional long-term spectrum sharing for diﬀerent
services, such a ﬁxed terrestrial and ﬁxed satellite links.
There are several methods of shorter-term more-dynamic
sharing that have been put forward. At a political level,
sharing seems to be pushed believing that this will lead
to far better spectrum utilization [28]. It has been sug-
gested that beneﬁcial sharing opportunities be identiﬁed
in licensed and license-exempt-bands, making suﬃcient
license-exempt band spectrum available for wireless inno-
vation, and deﬁning common paths to sharing based on
contractual arrangements.
New spectrum-sharing techniques can be sorted into two
groups [29], [30]. One is dynamic spectrum sharing, uti-
lizing parts or “holes” of spectrum with limited spectrum
rights. The other is a more-protected form, called autho-
rized shared access, licensed shared access, or priority ac-
cess. These methods span a gradually decreasing degree
of control, from exclusive rights to opportunistic dynamic
shared access.
3.2. Spectrum Trading
The economics of spectrum management cover many parts.
Some are tightly linked, and are of command and con-
trol regimes under an administrative spectrum management
regime. At the other end, spectrum access is a free-market
item [31]. However, for services such as mobile communi-
cations, spectrum is largely treated as property, following
on from suggestions by Coase [32]. Spectrum authorities
organize auctions for allocation of frequency blocks, rather
than other methods such as a contest or lottery.
Spectrum auctions have evolved since they were ﬁrst used
20 years ago. The goal should be a high degree of spec-
trum eﬃciency, and not maximum revenue from the auc-
tion, since the ﬁrst will create greater revenues, in the long
run. Cramton suggested a combinatorial clock auction as
being much better than a simultaneous ascending auction,
and that this will as well enable a technology-neutral ap-
proach, if wanted [33].
In free-market-controlled spectrum management, a spec-
trum-property system must be deﬁned [34], such as the
time for utilization, the area where it is valid, and the spec-
trum identiﬁed. These rights must be exchangeable. An
example deploying cognitive radio was given for micro-
trading of spectrum rights for mobile-service operations in
bands on a secondary basis [35], e.g., in broadcast bands
utilizing “holes”, called “white spaces”, opportunistically
non-used in the primary-user spectrum.
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Game-theoretical approaches have been suggested to eﬀec-
tively take advantage of the shared-spectrum regimes [36].
Intelligence in next-generation networks, with the concept
of equilibrium, will enable fair optimum spectrum utiliza-
tion. These ideas are still in the early phases, and more
research is needed.
An idea of a fully free spectrum utilization for any type
of network was suggested for the future mobile and wire-
less system [37]. The marketplace took over and services
were delivered by virtual operators. The value chain con-
sisted of the various elements, such as the spectrum, ra-
dio access network, value-added services, and so on, with
the diﬀerent actors and not with a single mobile-network
operator.
3.3. Free Access
Wireless local area networks (WLANs) in the form of Wi-
Fi have become a great success. A signiﬁcant part of the
broadband traﬃc from a large number of terminals will go
over Wi-Fi for at least part of the route. This happens in
spite of the fact that radio systems have no guaranties for
satisfactory access to the spectrum at 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz. It
is therefore not strange that the so-called “commons” spec-
trum is thought of as a future solution, and more should be
allocated for commons. In commons, speciﬁc rules apply,
and no management is needed. A rule can simply be just
to limit the radiated power to a maximum value. However,
as such, it is not really free use, as someone has to set the
rules and control the regime [38].
A radical suggestion has been proposed to allow anyone to
transit anywhere and anytime, as long as the transmission
does not cause interference that cannot be dealt with by the
other user [39]. The proposal is to create something called
“supercommons”, where technology manages both wanted
and unwanted signals, without other management.
4. Challenges and Dilemmas
The ITU’s spectrum management, based on intergovern-
mental negotiations at radio conferences, has matured since
the ﬁrst meetings in Berlin. Previous sections outlined the
way it has evolved and may further evolve. During the
century, this has assured the phenomenal progress in all
the ﬁelds that depend on applications of information and
communication technologies, and speciﬁcally wireless. The
history of radio has proven the ITU radio conferences to
be practical: no other ﬁeld of human activity has noted
a comparable rate of progress. The ITU has made it pos-
sible to seamlessly communicate around the globe, and to
assure the beneﬁts of scale. The mechanism is not ideal,
but it has been the only one possible: the only mechanism
all the ITU Member Countries could accept. Nevertheless,
this mechanism has been criticized by the private sector
and by civil society activists, by developed countries and
those developing: they all doubt if that mechanism fairly
serves all members of society. To complete this review, this
part oﬀers a closer look at some of these critical comments,
raised by various parties at various occasions.
For instance, a fundamental issue is the diﬀerence in the
national and international spectrum treatments. Interna-
tionally, spectrum is oﬀered for use for free, with no quotas
or licenses, and with only basic operational restrictions im-
posed on its use globally and regionally. However, nation-
ally it oﬀered as a sellable, rentable, or licensable commod-
ity (except for tiny ISM bands that are license-exempted).
The idea of spectrum sharing contradicts the concept of
exclusive spectrum use. License exempting negates the li-
censing. Free competition rules out regulations. Dynamic
spectrum management goes against spectrum plans, which
in turn excludes ad-hoc spectrum allocations. The idea of
transparency negates the trade-secret principle.
All of these ideas seem to follow the Cartesian approach, in
which a complex problem is broken down into smaller and
simpler bits, each for a speciﬁc partial problem separately
analyzed. Spectrum scarcity is a complex issue. It cannot
be fully understood in terms of its individual component
parts, disregarding complex interactions among them and
with the rest of the surrounding world. Spectrum scarcity
involves a combination of engineering, economic, politi-
cal, and social issues that cannot be separately solved [40].
A holistic approach is needed, treating the problem as
a whole within its full context. There is a striking sim-
ilarity between the radio-frequency spectrum and environ-
mental problems. The concept of a supernetwork may be
helpful here. Anna Nagurney [41] deﬁned it as a network
that is above and beyond classic networks (informational, ﬁ-
nancial, social, etc.), including complex interactions among
them, both visible and hidden. She classiﬁed supernet-
works as “system-optimized” or “user-optimized”. Equally
well, they could be termed “investor-profit-optimized” and
“customer-benefit-optimized”.
4.1. Representation
Some private sector representatives note that problems con-
sidered at the ITU radio conferences are in reality those of
competing companies. Direct negotiations between those
interested, without involvement of third parties, would be
cheaper, easier, and quicker, and the results would be bet-
ter for all, they say: governmental interventions distort the
competition. On the other hand, some civil society ac-
tivists accuse governments of representing only the interests
of the largest companies. They say such companies have
quite diﬀerent interests from small companies and individ-
uals, which are the weaker parts of society in each country.
Similarly, some delegates from developing countries believe
their negotiation positions are weaker, and their interests are
not taken into account as they should be. At intergovern-
mental forums, large enterprises lobby national delegations
to adopt their views as the country’s position. Small com-
panies and citizens usually lack resources to do so. Often,
they are unable to even properly formulate, justify, and con-
vey their views, or to predict all the consequences of the
proposals just negotiated. This section sums these up.
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4.1.1. Developing Regions
The ITU Member States diﬀer in population, wealth,
knowledge, and in many other aspects. Similar dispari-
ties among regions and social groups exist in each country.
They have diﬀerent potentials, needs, and lobbying pow-
ers [42]. Radio-spectrum negotiations imply a lot of diﬃ-
cult work to be done before and during the negotiations.
Documents for consideration may include hundreds and
thousands of statements, proposals, and counter-proposals,
each being a complex mixture of technical and legal issues.
Some of them may require an immediate reaction during the
meeting, as even a small oversight may have consequences
diﬃcult to correct later. Multiple committees and ad-hoc
groups at the conference, often working in parallel, create
serious problems for small delegations unable to participate
in more than one group at a time. The following excerpt
from the Bogota Declaration describes problems seen by
some delegates [43]:
The Treaty . . .cannot be considered as a ﬁnal
answer to the problem of the exploration and
use of outer space, even less when the in-
ternational community is questioning all the
terms of international law which were elabo-
rated when the developing countries could not
count on adequate scientiﬁc advice and were
thus not able to observe and evaluate the omis-
sions, contradictions and consequences of the
proposals which were prepared with great abil-
ity by the industrialized powers for their own
beneﬁt.
The declaration, published by a group of a few equatorial
states that felt they were being misled, voiced the opinion of
a larger group of countries that were only partially familiar
with the newest achievements of science and technology,
and felt to be outside of the closed “club of rich”. The
consensus idea is great under the assumption of a com-
mon interest, common understanding, and good will of all
the negotiators. Study Groups, mentioned earlier, aim at
reaching that, but unfortunately, not all Members can par-
ticipate in their studies, for various reasons. With this in
mind, conference preparatory meetings were long ago pro-
posed [44], [45], where the future delegates could be fa-
miliarized well in advance with problems to be negotiated.
That makes the preparations for Radio Conferences almost
a continuing occupation, which not all companies or even
countries can easily bear. Proposals to facilitate this by
wider automation of the ITU [46], which would close it
to medium access control (MAC) known from computer
technology, are not very popular; automates are still too
simplistic now. They cannot completely substitute for hu-
mans at the negotiations; moreover, they could make some
informal deals and secret agreements diﬃcult, if not im-
possible.
Wireless technologies eliminate the need for expensive ca-
ble networks, and their wide use would reduce the dispar-
ity among countries and improve connection with social
groups in poor, underdeveloped, or remote regions. Unfor-
tunately, the scarcity of free spectrum is a serious obstacle.
The world is now in the midst of a major debate about the
public-policy goals. The issue has been discussed at the
United Nations, the World Summit on Information Soci-
ety, the UNESCO-ITU Broadband Commission for Digital
Development, and at other forums. They have all set up
universal broadband connectivity as an essential element
of sustainable development. A series of steps have already
been made in order to make these more popular. However,
in spite of the progress made, the digital divide has not
disappeared. Figure 6 shows that it increased from about
some 20 percentage points in 2007 up to 70 percentage
points in 2014, and that the trend continues.
Fig. 6. The active mobile broadband subscriptions by level of
development, 2007 to 2014 (∗ denotes estimate [47]).
Generally, the growth of telecommunication services can
be described by logistic functions, which indicate that in
some cases the divide cannot be reduced, or could be
chaotic [48], [49]. The diverging lines of Figure 6 send
a strong message: the goal to eliminate the digital divide is
physically unrealizable, or our approach to it is ineﬃcient,
and needs a substantial review.
4.1.2. Civil Society
Ideally, a government operates diligently, and represents the
interests of all citizens in a just way. Unfortunately, this is
not always the case: not every government is seen by all the
citizens as trustworthy. To force honesty, civil-society ac-
tivists demand more transparency. They demand the right
to see the documents and negotiations to be sure that there
is no diﬀerence between what the government publicly de-
clares and what it does behind closed doors, hoping this
will limit corruption. In some countries, this has appeared
to be impossible, and they do not consent to allowing civil
society observers at ITU negotiations. However, recently,
under public pressure, the ITU has decided to provide free
online access to ITU-R recommendations, and some other
documents, to the general public. Providing such access
to all input and output documents of all ITU conferences
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(postulated since long ago, among others by the ﬁrst author
when he served at the ITU headquarters) was questioned.
The argument is that it would cause potential harm to pri-
vate or public interests, which could outweigh the beneﬁts
of accessibility.
Civil society activists also want to bring to the process a va-
riety of views and expertise that relate to ITU activities,
such as expansion, development, and adoption of informa-
tion and communication technologies, sustainable develop-
ment, access to knowledge, consumer rights, social justice,
and human rights. More and more often, one hears from
critics that proﬁt-oriented needs dominate those non-proﬁt
needs such as health care, education, science, etc., not men-
tioning the communication costs for ordinary citizens.
4.1.3. Science Interests
Observational radio astronomy explores extremely weak
electromagnetic radiations coming from the universe.
Space research, remote Earth exploration, and some other
sciences do similar exploration. Manmade radiations, no
matter whether intentional or spurious, can falsify these
observations, or make them useless. Unfortunately, the in-
tensity of manmade radiations increases from year to year.
The 1992 UNESCO conference [50] appealed to all inter-
governmental organizations to amplify eﬀorts toward pro-
tecting the future of such research. One of the ways to
do so is to improve the transparency of governmental de-
cisions at all levels, including voting at radio conferences.
We mentioned earlier the votes of two delegations at the
ﬁrst Berlin conference, which delayed the solution of com-
munications at high seas until the Titanic disaster. This was
the only case the authors found noted in conference docu-
ments since the time of Marconi. If there were other such
cases, they were outside of the conferences. Unfortunately,
bribery has been in the limelight from time to time, and
according to Brian Robinson, Chair of the Scientiﬁc Com-
mittee on Frequency Allocations for Radio Astronomy and
Space Science, known by its short designation as IUCAF,
the following note was included in his report [51]:
IUCAF members had to evolve from being
starry-eyed astronomers as they encountered
a world of politics, lobbying, entertainment,
threats, espionage, and bribery. On one occa-
sion, an oﬀer (in Geneva) of two million dollars
in cash “to shut up” proved no match for dedi-
cation to the joys and excitement of twentieth
century astrophysics.
The note mirrors relations existing within some countries,
rather than characterizing the ITU radio conferences.
4.2. Spectrum Planning
Plans introduce predictability valued by many: the partici-
pants in the TV planning conference in Geneva 2004/2006
considered their plan a great success. Planning is also the
only way to reserve a portion of the resource when it can-
not be shared after a faster competitor takes it. A position
in the geostationary satellite orbit is a good example here,
as the total number of such positions is physically limited.
However, spectrum planning has been criticized, and this
section explains why.
A frequency plan is understood as a table, or generally,
a function that assigns appropriate static characteristics to
each of the radio stations at hand. Examples are the oper-
ating frequency; power radiated; antenna location, height,
and radiation pattern; polarization; service area; etc. In
frequency plans, speciﬁc frequency bands are reserved
a priori for particular applications, well in advance of their
real use. Individual regions may have various allotment
plans for speciﬁc services (e.g., broadcasting), within their
respective areas.
The plans make a one-time distribution of the spectrum re-
source on the basis of the expected or declared needs of all
interested parties. Critics of the planning approach indicate
that it is inﬂexible and freezes technological progress. In-
deed, the progress is very fast, and implementation of the
plan may last several years. Technology known at the time
of creation of the plan may be obsolete at the time of its
implementation. Another diﬃculty is the impossibility of
predicting future requirements with a needed degree of ac-
curacy, and plans based on unrealistic data have no value.
Next, radio spectrum is available at no cost at international
planning conferences, and there is no mechanism to limit
the requirements, except for a general appeal for minimiz-
ing its use. There are no accepted or objective criteria for
evaluating each country’s stated needs, and there are no
quotas on the amount of spectrum assigned to each coun-
try. In fact, the individual country itself may have no idea
of its needs over the time period for which the plan is to be
constructed. It is thus not surprising that each country has
an incentive to overstate its requirements, rather than un-
derestimate. Under these circumstances, it is easy to make
a case that the plans are not only diﬃcult to construct, but
when constructed, will lead to a waste of spectrum and or-
bit, as noted by Glen O. Robinson of the Virginia School
of Law, a former FCC Commissioner [18].
4.2.1. Emergency Communications
The 1912 London Conference resolved the problem of
emergency communication at high seas, but left open other
problems for more than eighty years. In 1995, Hans Zim-
mermann of the UN Oﬃce for the Coordination of Human-
itarian Aﬀairs (OCHA) described the issue as follows [52]:
If anywhere on the ocean a vessel with a crew
of one is in distress, all related communica-
tions have absolute priority and are free of
charge . . .The necessity for absolute priority of
distress signals has been recognized worldwide
since the 14 of April 1912, when the “Titanic”
hit an iceberg. However when, after earth-
quake, some 10000 persons are trapped un-
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der the debris of buildings and houses, any
customs oﬃcial can prevent the arriving res-
cue teams from outside the aﬀected country
from entering this country with walkie-talkies.
And another oﬃcial might easily prevent the
teams from using their communications equip-
ment, unless they ﬁrst obtain a license from
a national telecommunication authority whose
building may just have collapsed in the earth-
quake. Also, if a team is, by chance, nev-
ertheless able to use its satellite terminal, they
are three months later presented with telephone
bills for tens of thousands of dollars. Such is
the sad experience of those who provide inter-
national humanitarian assistance in the age of
information super highways.
The problem was known for long and its solution was
known too. What was missing has been the willingness
to make practical steps, or there were insurmountable dif-
ferences in the hierarchies of values, or in conﬂicting in-
terests of large corporations. Many tragic disasters had
to happen until, under the pressure of the general public,
the governments agreed to remove interstate obstacles to
quick deployment of communication means during emer-
gencies. The 1986 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant disaster
was an example. A long time passed until the Convention
on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Dis-
aster Mitigation and Relief Operations was signed in Tam-
pere, in 1998 [53]. Although the convention has removed
major legal obstacles, physical and organizational barriers
have remained. Emergency communications are still far
away from what are needed and what are technically pos-
sible, as indicated in the 2000 OCHA evaluation report
[54]. To discharge the OCHA duties, the report proposed a
global emergency communication infrastructure accessible
to all, from any place at any time. The proposed infras-
tructure would be based on a constellation of low-orbiting
satellites, continuously accessible, like the GPS. In spite of
the ﬁfteen years that have passed since its publication, no
public discussion about its possible implementation even
started.
4.3. Monopoly
Monopoly means a lack of economic competition to pro-
duce the good or service, a lack of viable substitute goods,
and a high proﬁt. In most countries, monopoly is against
the law, except for the state monopoly. However, in many
countries, a legal monopoly is approved by the state if it
is justiﬁed by the need to provide an incentive to invest
in a risky venture, or for other reasons, e.g., to enrich
an interest group. Intellectual property rights (IPR), such
as copyrights, trademarks, patents, industrial design rights,
and trade secrets, are examples of such government-granted
monopolies. This section sums up some comments on the
topic.
4.3.1. AT&T Example
While the breaking of Marconi’s monopoly took a decade
or so, AT&T’s monopoly (and that of its subsidiaries, the
Bell System) operated in the USA for more than a century:
from 1875 until 1984. There were six thousand independent
(wired) telephone companies in the US serving three mil-
lion subscribers. However, subscribers to diﬀerent compa-
nies could not call each other because the competing com-
panies refused connections. The AT&T monopoly solved
the problem. AT&T was granted the status of a “regulated
natural monopoly”, obliged to provide universal, end-to-
end integrated, efficient, and inexpensive telecommunica-
tion services. The doctrine of natural monopoly says that
regulation is the most appropriate substitute for the com-
petitive marketplace provided it is independent, intelligent,
considerate, thorough, and just. Due to economies of scale,
grouping of like activities in a single company in many
cases could assure better and more eﬃcient service to the
public than a number of separate mutually competing com-
panies could oﬀer.
AT&T used its unique position and wealth to create the
Bell Laboratories in 1925, which became one of the best
and largest telecommunication research laboratories in the
world. They developed radio astronomy, the transistor, the
laser, the charge-coupled device (CCD), the UNIX operat-
ing system, the C, S, and C++ programming languages,
information theory, and many other things. Seven Nobel
Prizes were awarded for work completed at Bell Laborato-
ries. Being a regulated monopoly, Bell Labs were largely
insulated from market pressures. That allowed them to de-
velop a culture that venerated quality and excellence within
a noncompetitive framework of innovation and practicabil-
ity. In 1984, AT&T ended operation as a monopolist, and
most of the former Bell Labs have been scaled down, or
shut down entirely. The divestiture was not welcomed by
everybody, as one can read in the history of AT&T [55]:
. . . the global telecommunications industry en-
tered an era of unprecedented chaos and insta-
bility – marked by oversupply, fraud, a com-
plicated regulatory environment and nonstop
pricing pressures. Combined, these forces led
to an industry meltdown in which numerous
bankruptcies, defaults and business failures oc-
curred; investors lost billions and countless
workers in the communications sector lost their
jobs.
Other critics pointed out fragmentation and repetition of
eﬀorts, and a lot of energy and resources lost in mutual
ﬁghts. Another comment underlined that after the divesti-
ture, no company could create and maintain a research lab-
oratory of comparable scale and quality. The reason was
high costs and risk of research confronted with smaller in-
come (due to a divided market) and an uncertain future
(due to competition). Some one hundred years after break-
ing Marconi’s monopoly, the OECD stated [56]:
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Limited spectrum and increasing demand for
data services mean that mobile networks will
strive to oﬄoad traﬃc to ﬁxed networks. . . The
challenge for regulator is that, regardless of the
technology used, many parts of the OECD look
likely to face monopolies or duopolies for ﬁxed
networks. Wireless can provide competition,
but spectrum availability will always limit that
are not a constraint for ﬁbre.
4.3.2. Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property rights (IPR) have two sides. One side
is the interest of the owner of the rights. On the other
side are the interests of the rest. This helps in protecting
a monopoly from competition, with society often paying
for it. Consider smartphones, for example. The last few
years noted over 140 patent disputes on these alone, with
the litigation costs running up to US$3 million per suit.
Just two companies, Apple and Samsung, have disputed
over US$2 billion in patent-related damage compensa-
tions [57]–[59]. Armstrong and his colleagues estimated
patent royalties on a hypothetical US$400 smartphone to
be in excess of US$120, which almost equals the cost of
the device’s components. The costs of the disputes may
reduce the proﬁtability and incentives to invest and com-
pete. Most patent disputes are sterile, and not in the best
interest of society. They absorb time and money that could
instead be better used improving the products or lowering
their price. Intellectual property rights play an important
societal role that largely exceeds the commercial interests
of a single company. With the present practices, “only
lawyers win in patent wars”, as Popelka brieﬂy put it [60].
4.3.3. Spectrum Privatization
Guaranteed exclusivity in the use of a band of spectrum is
a form of monopoly. It can be granted through privatiza-
tion or licensing. The former oﬀers the owner maximum
freedom in the use of spectrum. From the access view-
point, the licensed exclusivity does not diﬀer much from
spectrum ownership. The inﬂuence of large corporations
has been growing, and so has been the pressure to priva-
tize the spectrum and free it from any regulations as much
as possible. The ultimate goal is to replace the spectrum
commons by private spectrum [61], and licensing by free
competition, also known as the survival-of-the-fittest doc-
trine. This doctrine says that the strong should see their
wealth and power increase, while the weak should see their
wealth and power decrease, disappearing at the end. It
implies taking out some form of collective ownership and
handing over resources to private owners, if possible. David
Bollier, a popular promoter of public interests, compared
the private appropriation of collectively owned resources
to the movement to enclose common lands in England.
The process started there in the XVIth century, and now
most of the previously common land belongs to individu-
als that in total account for less than 0.1% of the popula-
tion [62]–[64]. Its more recent variant is known as free-
market environmentalism.
More and more countries grant exclusive licenses to the
highest bidders, and open the secondary spectrum markets.
Seeking the maximum possible return on the investment
dollar is a strong motivating force, but it threatens other
important values. Not everybody accepts that a rush for
proﬁt should be the only, or the most important, driving
force in life. Many prophets and philosophers have long
since indicated the negative eﬀects of this. Recently, even
major economists noticed this problem [65]. If not re-
stricted by rules of tradition, religion, law, ethics, rational
moderation, or by other factors, excessive greed may easily
destroy the social order, and lead to crime and wars.
4.3.4. Spectrum Ownership Doctrine
Except for radio waves of natural origin, radio frequencies
are inherent characteristics of radio devices: the latter can-
not exist or operate without the former. The ownership of
a device logically extends over the RF waves radiated or
received by it. The spectrum-ownership concept interrupts
that connection. Named flexible spectrum use by Robert
Matheson [66], the concept also ignores electromagnetic
interactions and the inherent dynamics of the radio-signal
environment. The doctrine is based on two simple rules.
One assures the owner’s rights: “Transmit within signal
power restrictions inside your licensed electro-space re-
gion”, while the other protects the neighbor’s rights: “Keep
your signals below ‘X’ outside that region”. This exploits
an apparent analogy between land ownership and spectrum
ownership over the speciﬁc service region. When you own
a walled garden, you can arrange the garden at will as long
as you remain within the walls. However, with spectrum it
is not as simple as it might look at ﬁrst glance, because it is
impossible to determine the “walls” of spectrum property
with any precision.
One has to realize that the unguided wave-propagation laws
do not allow for any abrupt change of signal power. Simple
borderlines between the inside and outside at the edge of
the service region are physically unrealizable in free space:
a ﬁnite-sized buffer region separates neighboring service
regions. That buﬀer region must be sterile. None of the
neighbors can extend his/her radio services there, unless
special precautions are applied; careful coordination of ge-
ographic distance, signal-power density, frequency, time, or
coding might be necessary. Second, the ﬂexible-spectrum-
use doctrine is static, and neglects the impact of a chang-
ing environment, which can change [67], [68] without the
owner’s consent or even knowledge.
Without ﬁrmly freezing the future signal environment, e.g.,
through strict spectrum planning, such uncertainties reduce
the secondary spectrum marked to nil. That fact calls into
question the very concept of private spectrum and its ﬂex-
ible use for active services, not mentioning the more dif-
ﬁcult case of the property of frequencies used for passive
services. Laws of physics ﬁrmly say that in a dense sig-
nal environment, no freedom exists in the use of spectrum.
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While the idea of privately owned spectrum makes sense
in the case of isolated radio systems, it is physically un-
realizable where the spectrum is congested. With proper
spectrum management, the probability of such interactions
is analyzed before issuing the license, and is kept at an
acceptable level.
4.4. Spectrum Market
The spectrum market is not a new idea. The thought of sell-
ing spectrum rights was put forward for the ﬁrst time at the
1906 Berlin conference. The Russian delegation suggested
a kind of transit fees for radio waves propagating over the
country’s territory. Some ﬁfty years later, in 1959 Ronald
Coase of the FCC suggested property rights and spectrum
market as a more eﬃcient method of allocating the spec-
trum to users. (He was the laureate of the 1991 Nobel Prize
in Economic Sciences, for his work on transaction costs and
property rights). Then Equatorial countries, in their Bogota
Declaration, mentioned earlier, claimed that the satellites
located above their territories should pay a kind of park-
ing fee. In 1995, Richard Butler, then the ITU Secretary
General, put forward that positions of orbiting satellites be
traded, and the income be used to ﬁnance the activities
of the ITU. He did that when some ITU Member States
failed to pay their contributions: with no cash, he would
have been forced to close operations and ﬁre the staﬀ. The
Member States rather preferred to pay the contributions
than to rent orbital positions or shut down the ITU. None of
the privatization ideas have been accepted until now at the
international forum. The majority of ITU Member States
ﬁrmly supported the commons character of the radio spec-
trum and satellite orbits.
Spectrum auctioning has been practiced in a number of
countries. For governments, it has become attractive be-
cause it solves the access rights to spectrum in cases where
too many are interested, and also provides money inﬂow to
the budget. However, the FCC Commissioners, like many
other experts, long opposed the idea of a spectrum market,
so it had to wait some thirty years for its ﬁrst implemen-
tation. Interestingly, it did happen in New Zealand and
not in the USA, as one could expect. New Zealand intro-
duced spectrum auctions for tradable leases up to 20 years
in 1989. However, many are against spectrum auctions.
Earl Holliman, the US Army Spectrum Manager, wrote:
We hear a lot about auctions. The auction ap-
proach does not stimulate technology towards
more eﬃcient frequency uses. It lets a suc-
cessful bidder only get richer and pushes the
smaller operator back.
For companies, auctions involve large uncertainties and
high risks: the expected and needed proﬁts for planned
operations might never come true. For customers, they
may mean an increase in the price of services. Huge
amounts have been paid for frequency bands that were
never used [69], [70]. Some auctions are seemingly used
to block competitors rather than to put the spectrum into
use. Auctions have been claimed to be corruption-immune,
but several scandals have shown the opposite. The 2010
spectrum scam in India, quoted earlier, was an example.
Some economists do not believe in the eﬃciency of the
free market. For instance, Joseph Stiglitz, the laureate of
the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, says it is only
under exceptional circumstances the markets can be eﬃ-
cient. He wrote [71]:
For more than 20 years, economists were en-
thralled by so-called ‘rational expectations’
models which assumed that all participants
have the same (if not perfect) information
and act perfectly rationally, that markets are
perfectly eﬃcient, that unemployment never
exists. . . and where there is never any credit
rationing. That such models prevailed, espe-
cially in America’s graduate schools, despite
evidence to the contrary, bears testimony to
a triumph of ideology over science. Unfortu-
nately, students of these graduate programmes
now act as policymakers in many countries,
and are trying to implement programmes based
on the ideas that have come to be called market
fundamentalism.
Numerous other authors are of similar opinions, such as,
e.g., Eli M. Noam, Samuel A. Simon, Joseph H. Weber, and
Yohai Benkler. Most surprisingly, George Soros, a famous
billionaire, joined other critics, writing [72]:
Although I have made a fortune in the ﬁnancial
markets, I now fear that the untrammeled in-
tensiﬁcation of laissez-faire capitalism and the
spread of market values into all areas of life is
endangering our open and democratic society.
The UN has called a special summit to consider, among
other problems, the “Fundamental Defects of the Free Mar-
ket System” [73]. The 2011 Washington Declaration on in-
tellectual property and the public interest clearly stated [74]:
Markets alone cannot be relied upon to achieve
a just allocation of information goods – that is,
one that promotes the full range of human val-
ues at stake in intellectual property systems.
This is clear, for example, from recent expe-
riences in the areas of public health and ed-
ucation, where intellectual property has com-
plicated progress toward meeting these basic
public needs.
This would indicate that practices protecting intellectual
property rights should be seen from a wider socio-economic
viewpoint, taking into account society as a whole: not only
those who beneﬁt now, but also those who pay or loose in
a longer perspective.
Many worry that privatization, if widely introduced,
would be incapable of assuring balanced sustainable socio-
economic development; that government and corporate
123
Ryszard Strużak, Terje Tjelta, and Jose´ P. Borrego
surveillance would increase without limits; that the free
ﬂow of content we are now proud of would stop; and that in-
tellectual property rights would extend into the interminable
past. The uncertainty results from our dilemmas on the hi-
erarchy of values. Erich Fromm, a German philosopher,
put it brieﬂy: “to have, or to be?” – a basic question to
which everybody has their own answer. Spectrum trading
also oﬀers opportunities to the beneﬁt of both operators and
the society served, when spectrum can be more eﬀectively
utilized in an area or a market.
4.4.1. Competition
In the opinion of many experts, the progress in mobile
and broadband communications, and generally in the radio
applications we enjoy today, would not have developed at
the pace we have seen if there were no competition. It may
not be so easy to prove generally, but for many, the cost
of communication services has not increased in the latest
decades. Rather, the opposite has occurred relative to daily
spending for living, and such services have become much
more aﬀordable [75]. Furthermore, information and com-
munication technology services have become much more
important, highly beneﬁcial, and even absolute necessary
for a well-functioning society.
However, other cases show that competition may not serve
society well, as illustrated by the following example. When
serving in the ITU headquarters, the ﬁrst author organized
the CCIR library of spectrum-management software freely
oﬀered by ITU Members. The software could be copied
and used at no cost by all those interested. This was func-
tioning well, but a problem appeared when the program
for practical planning of low-power (local) TV stations was
oﬀered [76]. It was then one of few programs using digital
terrain models and inexpensive personal computers. It gen-
erated great interest among small and medium enterprises,
in both developed and developing countries. Its user in-
terface was in Polish, and it was proposed to translate it
into English and other ITU oﬃcial languages, which would
make it more useful in many countries. However, a few
delegates representing private business were against this,
arguing that “it would kill our business”. As no required
consensus was reached, the proposal was not approved. In
addition, as a consequence, there is no such free software
provided by ITU today.
With the consensus rule, a single company can easily block
other enterprises, but opposite cases also happened. For in-
stance, one can learn from the FCC home page that Edwin
Armstrong, an American inventor, proposed his frequency-
modulation system in 1935. However, companies in the
United States, afraid that it would reduce their proﬁts,
blocked it for some twenty-ﬁve years, until the 1960s.
Similarly, for more than a decade, civilian applications of
spread-spectrum technology were blocked. More recently,
the promising low-Earth orbit (LEO) [77] and high-altitude
platform (HAP) [78] technologies were blocked. The ma-
jority blamed the general crisis for that, but some suspected
the competing companies of signiﬁcantly contributing to
that. More recently, the FCC stated that it had to protect
consumers from mobile-broadband providers’ commercial
practices masquerading as “reasonable network manage-
ment”. Working hand in hand with citizens, the FCC is
setting “strong rules that protect consumers from past and
future tactics that threaten the Open Internet” and promote
“more broadband, better broadband, and open broadband
networks”. The providers hold all the tools necessary to
deceive consumers, degrade content, or disfavor the con-
tent that they don’t like. Some companies make practical
use of these tools, keeping third-party applications within
a carrier-controlled “walled garden”, as in the early days of
electrical communications. That practice ended when the
Internet protocol (IP) created the opportunity to leap the
wall, but the FCC has continued to hear concerns about
other broadband-provider practices involving blocking or
degrading third-party applications.
4.5. Spectrum Sharing
Privatization pressure provoked countermovement and the
revival of interest in spectrum commons and cooperatives.
One of the most respected researchers in that area was Eli-
nor Ostrom, a US economist and the only woman who
won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (in 2009), for
“her analysis of economic governance, especially the com-
mons”. Her studies have indicated that the commons are
sustainable if they are well managed, best done by their
owners, themselves. Interestingly, that principle has intu-
itively been practiced on the global scale by ITU Members
since 1906, well before Ostrom’s studies. More recently,
the principle was extended over the users of Wi-Fi and
similar technologies, which became the most popular use
of spectrum commons. For instance, in 2013, more Inter-
net traﬃc was carried over Wi-Fi than via any other path,
resulting in some US$222 billion in value added to the
US economy alone [79]. That evidences the practicality of
spectrum sharing and the numerous beneﬁts in comparison
with the exclusive (private or licensed) spectrum, including
lower access cost. Note that there has always been a part of
the wealth kept in common, examples being public roads
and parks. Since the very beginning, spectrum access has
been free for each and any government: what many civil
society activists expect is an extension of that practice over
individual spectrum users, without any governmental bro-
kerage.
The US President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology (PCAST) suggested a three-tier “dynamic shar-
ing” Spectrum Access System (SAS), making spectrum
sharing the norm. Under the Spectrum Access System, Fed-
eral primary systems would receive the highest priority and
protection from harmful interference. Secondary licensees
would register deployments and receive some quality-of-
service protections, possibly in exchange for fees. General
Authorized-Access users would be allowed opportunistic
access to unoccupied spectrum (when no Primary or Sec-
ondary Access users were using a given frequency band
in a speciﬁc geographical area or time period) [80]. The
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National Telecommunication and Information Agency has
already identiﬁed a total of 960 MHz of federal spectrum
as candidates for sharing using that approach. The Euro-
pean Commission is considering similar sharing possibili-
ties, based on contracts between the users. This is seen as
a natural extension of the previous spectrum policies: li-
censed access allowing operators to oﬀer a predicted quality
of service, and license-exempt access fostering widespread
contributions to innovation and fast-paced investment in
emerging technologies [81]. However, incumbent commer-
cial or government users may be reluctant to give up their
exclusive rights to individual spectrum bands, concerned
about already made or planned long-term investments in
communication networks, including access to spectrum.
And yet, technology is being developed and deployed to
allow for such sharing by new entrants without risking in-
terference to the incumbents’ systems. A number of coun-
tries have pursued regulations or trials that enable license-
exempt, Wi-Fi-like devices to access vacant spectrum in
the television broadcast bands (“white spaces”). These are
expected to improve Internet access, facilitate the delivery
of government services, establish communication channels
in the wake of earthquakes, typhoons, etc.
4.6. Other Issues
Since the very beginning, scientists have worked on issues
that have extended our knowledge about the universe, and
made our lives easier, safer, and richer. There is a wealth
of literature on the beneﬁts radio waves have brought to
humanity. However, that progress has also brought nega-
tive eﬀects. The perception of electromagnetic waves has
been changing. From an abstract concept, it morphed to
a tradable commodity, and from a scientiﬁc curiosity, to an
apparatus of indoctrination, a weapon in physical conﬂicts,
and a tool for criminals. In addition to the unknown long-
term biological side eﬀects of man-generated electromag-
netic waves, there are also other sources of worry. Like
health, they only indirectly relate to spectrum use. Dis-
cussing them in detail clearly exceeds the scope of this
article, so we only mention some here, which we believe
are needed to better understand the role and complexity of
spectrum management.
4.6.1. Orbital Debris
Since 1957, after the launch of the ﬁrst Earth-orbiting ar-
tiﬁcial satellite, the near-Earth environment has served as
a gigantic rubbish collector. Orbital debris (also called
space debris) is a collection of man-made objects launched
into space and left there with no purpose after their mission
ended. They are dead satellites and their fragments, upper
stages of rockets and their fragments, and other abandoned
objects. The total number of these objects is counted in the
millions of pieces. It increases with every new launch of
a space object and with each new satellite explosion, and
with accidental fragmentation or due to anti-satellite tests
in outer space. These objects are all orbiting with hyper
velocities of a few to dozens of kilometers per second, and
can damage operating satellites and space vehicles. For
comparison, the velocity of a bullet ﬁred from the famous
AK 101 Kalashnikov riﬂe is less that one kilometer per sec-
ond. The threat of impact damage is a growing concern.
Medium-size objects (0.1 cm to 10 cm in diameter) are the
greatest challenge, because they are not easily tracked, and
have a kinetic energy high enough to cause catastrophic
damage. For instance, a particle with a mass of 10 g mov-
ing 10 km/s has a kinetic energy comparable to a one-ton
car running on a highway at a speed of 100 km/h. Penetra-
tion of even a small particle through a critical component,
such as a ﬂight computer or propellant tank, can result in
loss of a spacecraft. If a 10 cm object of 1 kg mass collided
with a typical spacecraft bus, over one million fragments
of 1 mm in size and larger could be created, according
to NASA. Such a collision would result in the formation
of a debris cloud, which poses a magniﬁed impact risk to
any other spacecraft in the orbital vicinity. Mutual colli-
sions can further multiply the numbers. Encounters with
clouds of smaller particles can also be devastating for fu-
ture missions. For instance, the solar panels of the Hubble
Space Telescope (launched in 1990 and remaining in oper-
ation) have been replaced several times because of damage
caused by tiny objects. Such objects may also eﬃciently
block scientiﬁc observations of some regions in the sky.
A few countries do radar, optical, and infrared surveillance
of space for security reasons. The smallest traceable objects
are about 10 cm in diameter at low altitudes, and about
1 m in diameter at geostationary orbit. Some space debris
could escape towards other celestial bodies, burn in the
atmosphere, or fall on the Earth. However, to do so their
velocity must change. What slows them and forces them to
fall down is air drag, but this decreases with altitude. At
high altitudes, it is negligible, which implies a long time
for orbiting in space. Table 1 lists the expected orbital
lifetimes for selected circular orbits.
Table 1
The lifetimes of circular orbits [82]
Orbital Altitude [km] Lifetime
200 1–4 days
600 25–30 years
1000 2000 years
2000 20 000 years
36 000 (GSO) Indeﬁnite
At geostationary (GSO) altitude, no eﬀective natural re-
moval mechanism exists, except for solar-radiation pres-
sure. From a practical standpoint, objects located in geo-
stationary orbit would indeﬁnitely remain in that vicin-
ity, if not moved at the end of a mission. Orbital debris
is a good illustration of the CC-PP (communize costs –
privatize proﬁts) behavior of satellite companies ﬁrst de-
scribed by Hardin, mentioned earlier. Some of the ob-
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jects launched are sent back to the Earth, especially after
the invention of re-useable space vehicles, but the creation
rate of debris has outpaced the removal rate. Maintain-
ing the current design and operational practices could ul-
timately render some regions in space useless, and even
dangerous.
4.6.2. Issues to Watch
The future of radio applications may not be as wonder-
ful as it could be, and as most people would like it to
be. Technological progress is often driven by military pro-
grams that aim at improving ways enemies are destroyed,
or allies are protected. However, many byproducts of these
programs ﬁnd later civilian applications, making our life
easier, healthier, and pleasanter. Unfortunately, a military
invention might also become accessible to criminals, or
a government might use it against their own citizens: the
latter practice ends often in a government overthrow or
revolution.
4.6.2.1. Propaganda
Radio as a wartime propaganda tool become popular dur-
ing World War II (it later was supplemented by television).
Wireless can bring all the persuasive power to millions
of people at relatively low cost, ignoring national borders
and front lines. However, its power was demonstrated ear-
lier, in 1938, in the USA, after the airing of The War of
the Worlds, an innocent episode of a radio drama series.
Orson Wells presented it so realistically that the radio
transmission was taken as real news, and caused mass
panic, diﬃcult to manage. Since then, radio and televi-
sion have become major advertising means. However, they
also serve as eﬃcient propaganda and brainwashing tools
in political/ideological campaigns. More recently, mobile
phones, SMS (short messaging service) and online social-
networking services such as Twitter and Facebook have
similarly aﬀected the social lives and activities of people,
starting from the election campaigns in the USA to social
protests such as Occupy Wall Street or the Arab Spring of
2010. The unprecedented ease and scale of wirelessly ma-
nipulating public opinion worries many. The Arab Spring
protests transformed into revolutions that overthrew a few
governments. It explains why so many other governments
want to control the access to radio waves and to the infor-
mation they carry.
4.6.2.2. Espionage, Cyber Attacks, and Jamming
The fear of war, criminal acts, or losing power pushes gov-
ernments not only to license access to spectrum, but to
also develop intelligence, eavesdropping, and surveillance,
which is relatively easy in the case of wireless communica-
tions. However, these may also be used against the citizens’
right to privacy. Some years ago, the European Parliament
initiated an investigation into the ECHELON system [83],
created to monitor the military and diplomatic communi-
cations of the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold
War. With time, it had evolved, allegedly becoming a global
system for the interception of any communications over the
globe, including private and commercial communications.
Another worrying issue is massive surveying of people.
According to the press, there is one surveillance camera
for every eleven people in Great Britain. An even more
worrying issue is the use of radio waves for criminal at-
tacks and secret wars in cyberspace [84]. Real data from
that area are rarely published, but the scale of the issue
can be judged from the expenses incurred. According to
the press, the defense cyberspace budget for 2015 includes
US$5 billion in the USA alone; other countries may spend
proportionally.
Jamming was widely used during World War II and the
Cold War. Later, unintended interference was often noted.
For instance, deliberate jamming of telecommunications
satellites was observed and increased between 2009 and
2012. In several circumstances, France raised this issue to
the Radio Regulations Board. Several European countries
also submitted a proposal to WRC-12 on this issue, which
led to an evolution of the Radio Regulations that gave more
weight to the issue of deliberate interference.
4.6.3. Power from Space
New, cheap, and environmentally friendly energy sources
are now sought in several countries. The world’s popula-
tion is expected to reach 10 billion people by the year 2050,
and the present energy sources will be insuﬃcient to satisfy
their needs, according to current projections. Among var-
ious ideas, the space solar power (SSP) concept has been
studied. In 2007, URSI published a comprehensive report
on the topic [85]. Among additional possible solar-power
satellite (SPS) applications, the report listed sending energy
from spacecraft to spacecraft, bringing energy to remote
areas on the globe that are diﬃcult to otherwise access,
or providing energy to the dark side of the moon. The
report stressed that URSI did not unanimously advocate
solar-power satellites. Within URSI, there are both advo-
cates of solar-power satellites, and voices of concern and
severe reservation.
The solar-power satellite studies started in the USA, during
the oil crisis of the seventies, aimed at limiting the depen-
dence of the national economy on foreign oil. In 1974,
a patent was granted for a solar power satellite to collect
power from the sun in space, and then transmit it down
using a microwave beam to the Earth for use. One of the
more recent solar-power satellite systems considered huge
(∼10 km2) arrays of photovoltaic cells placed in an Earth
orbit, or on the moon to convert the sunlight into electric-
ity. Such arrays would be unaﬀected by cloud cover, atmo-
spheric dust, or by the Earth’s twelve-hour day-night cycle.
To reduce the necessary area of costly solar arrays, sunlight
could be additionally concentrated using giant mirrors. The
incident solar radiation would be converted into electricity
using the photovoltaic process. Another part that would
manifest itself as heat could also be converted into elec-
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tricity using thermoelectric devices. These would serve as
thermal pumps, removing heat from the photovoltaic panels
and lowering their temperature.
The electricity would then be converted to microwaves,
and beamed by a composite space antenna (∼6 km2) to-
wards a huge Earth antenna (∼12 km2). The space an-
tenna would assure a pointing accuracy of about 0.0005◦,
which would mean about a ∼300 m pointing error on
the Earth’s surface. The terrestrial antenna would contain
a large number of receiving antennas combined with recti-
ﬁers and ﬁlters (called a rectenna), which would convert the
microwave power into electrical current, injected into the
power network. To limit the health danger, the receiving
antenna would be located in the desert, or in mountains
far away from densely populated areas. The size of the
microwave beam could be large enough to keep the power
density within safe limits.
A space solar-power system using today’s technology could
generate energy at a higher cost than the current market
price. One estimate was that it would take 15 to 25 years
of further research to overcome that diﬀerence. In 2001,
Japan announced that they plan to launch a giant solar-
power station by 2040. Preparatory studies are also being
undertaken in the European Union and in the United States.
There are many questions to be solved. For instance, the
URSI report quoted earlier lists the following:
What is the impact of SPS electromagnetic
emissions – both intended and unwanted (har-
monics of the microwave frequency, unex-
pected and harmful radiation resulting from
malfunctions) at microwave frequencies and
other related frequencies – on telecommu-
nications, remote sensing, navigation satel-
lite systems, and radio-astronomical observa-
tions? What actions can be taken to suppress
this unwanted emission? Constraints imposed
by the Radio Regulations of the International
Telecommunication Union must be taken into
account.
However, more important questions remain to be solved
before solar-power satellites could operate, e.g., health and
environmental problems not yet solved. Others have indi-
cated that it is potentially a double application technology:
a solar-power satellite station could easily be converted into
a dangerous weapon. Space weapons using solar energy
are not a new idea. In World War II, some German sci-
entists were speculating on the use of gigantic mirrors that
could concentrate solar energy to set ﬁre to an enemy’s
cities, manufacturing, crop ﬁelds, etc., during wartime.
High-power microwave beams could cause similar dam-
age. Between the wars, the solar-power satellite mirrors
could be used to control local weather conditions over a se-
lected region. The size, complexity, environmental hazards,
and cost of a space solar power undertaking are daunting
challenges.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper has reviewed basic issues of radiofrequency
spectrum use. It has shown how deeply our current con-
cepts are rooted in the past, and how often they are dictated
by the short-term beneﬁts of the few. It has summarized
arguments and lessons learned since the invention of ra-
dio, which could be usable in current debates on how to
reduce the chronic apparent shortage of RF spectrum. It
has highlighted major doctrines focusing on a better under-
standing of how the spectrum-management mechanisms are
associated with the public interest and distribution of infor-
mation, knowledge, wealth, and power. It pointed up sim-
ilarities between spectrum conservation and environmental
protection. The paper is intended to promote cooperation,
transparency, and direct involvement of spectrum users into
its management process. It focused on issues that could be
improved through good will, negotiations, and consensus
without in principle requiring extra resources.
The fundamental question of whether it is better to privatize
the spectrum or to keep it as a regulated commons, to sell it,
or to distribute it freely, will probably be open for decades.
Many have hoped for a long time that science and engi-
neering will solve the spectrum-scarcity problem. Science
and engineering are universal – independent of national-
ity, ideological convictions, or political orientation – which
makes joint eﬀorts much easier than in any other ﬁeld.
However, history shows the opposite: spectrum scarcity
increases with the progress made in science and engineer-
ing. Many have anticipated such an approach to spectrum
management could be as useful as it has been found to be
in the military. However, negotiations and lobbying will
probably continue as the basis for spectrum management
for a long time. Human motivations and ways of thinking
have not changed much since the invention of radio, and
most probably will not change in the foreseeable future,
shaping spectrum use. The reason is that society is not
uniform. It is composed of groups, each having diﬀerent
world views, interests, needs, and powers. What is best
for one group is not necessarily good for the others. The
dominant group usually tries to use all possible means and
ways to keep the beneﬁts it acquired as long as possible.
The ITU negotiation system has evolved during 150 years
and each radio conference makes it better, but it is still
not ideal: some of its weaknesses were indicated in the
above sections. Notwithstanding this, the history of radio
has evidenced that in spite of the threat of supporting some
particular interests [22], it has been serving humanity well,
not to mention that it has been the only acceptable mecha-
nism. That is an optimistic view. An even more optimistic
remark is that the ITU system is not static: it is a dynamic
and self-healing system (even if it now recommends static
spectrum allocations). The more people understand bet-
ter spectrum-management mechanisms, the more chances
the system will be improved at a future conference. Vari-
ous forums exist within and outside of the ITU to discuss
and understand better problems accompanying the uses of
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the radio spectrum, not only the positive uses but also the
negative uses; not only seen from a narrow engineering
or economic viewpoint, but also from a wider perspective.
These forums try to call attention to the need for limiting
the negative eﬀects before they develop in full. Should
the voice of radio scientists be heard there? ITU has not
yet deﬁnitely solved the spectrum-scarcity problem, just as
the whole of humanity has not solved problems of hunger,
health, and many others. According to Hardin, quoted ear-
lier, the scarcity problem cannot be ultimately solved only
by technical means, without involving the system of hu-
man values and ideas. Mahatma Gandhi, the famous Indian
leader, put it brieﬂy as follows:
There is enough on the Earth to meet every-
body’s need but not suﬃcient to meet any-
body’s greed.
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